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Abstract—Smart devices with built-in sensors, computational
capabilities, and network connectivity have become increasingly
pervasive. The crowds of smart devices offer opportunities to col-
lectively sense and perform computing tasks in an unprecedented
scale. This paper presents Crowd-ML, a privacy-preserving
machine learning framework for a crowd of smart devices, which
can solve a wide range of learning problems for crowdsensing
data with differential privacy guarantees. Crowd-ML endows
a crowdsensing system with an ability to learn classifiers or
predictors online from crowdsensing data privately with minimal
computational overheads on devices and servers, suitable for
a practical and large-scale employment of the framework. We
analyze the performance and the scalability of Crowd-ML, and
implement the system with off-the-shelf smartphones as a proof
of concept. We demonstrate the advantages of Crowd-ML with
real and simulated experiments under various conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Crowdsensing
Smart devices are increasingly pervasive in daily life.
These devices are characterized by their built-in sensors (e.g.,
accelerometers, cameras, and, microphones), programmable
computation ability, and Internet connectivity via wireless or
cellular networks. These include stationary devices such as
smart thermostats and mobile devices such as smartphones
or in-vehicle systems. More and more devices are also being
interconnected, often referred to as the “Internet of Things.”
Inter-connectivity offers opportunities for crowds of smart
devices to collectively sense and compute in an unprecedented
scale. Various applications of crowdsensing have been pro-
posed, including personal health/fitness monitoring, environ-
mental sensing, and monitoring road/traffic conditions (see
Section II-A), and the list is currently expanding.
Crowdsensing is used primarily for collecting and analyzing
aggregate data from a population of participants. However,
more complex and useful tasks can be performed beyond
calculation of aggregate statistics, by using machine learning
algorithms on crowdsensing data. Examples of such tasks
include: learning optimal settings of room temperatures for
smart thermostats; predicting user activity for context-aware
services and physical monitoring; suggesting the best driving
routes; recognizing audio events from microphone sensors.
Specific algorithms and data types for these tasks are different,
but they can all be trained in standard unsupervised or super-
vised learning settings: given sensory features (time, location,
motion, environmental measures, etc.), train an algorithm
or model that can accurately predict a variable of interest
(temperature setting, current user activity, amount of traffic,
audio events, etc.). Conventionally, crowdsensing and machine
learning are performed as two separate processes: devices
passively collect and send data to a central location, and
analyses or learning procedures are performed at the remote
location. However, current generations of smart devices have
computing capabilities in addition to sensing. In this paper,
we propose to utilize computing capabilities of smart devices,
and integrate sensing and learning processes together into a
crowdsensing system. As we will show, the integration allows
us to design a system with better privacy and scalability.
B. Privacy
Privacy is an important issue for crowdsensing applications.
By assuring participants’ privacy, a crowdsensing system
can appeal to a larger population of potential participants,
which increases the utility of such a system. However, many
crowdsensing systems in the literature do not employ any
privacy-preserving mechanism (see Section II-B), and existing
mechanisms used in crowdsensing (see [1]) are often difficult
to compare qualitatively across different systems or data types.
In the last decade, differential privacy has gained popularity
as a formal and quantifiable measure of privacy risk in data
publishing [2]–[4]. Briefly, differential privacy measures how
much the outcome of a procedure changes probabilistically by
presence/absence of any single subject in the original data. The
measure provides an upper bound on privacy loss regardless
of the content of data or any prior knowledge an adversary
might have. While differential privacy has been applied in
data publishing and machine learning, (see Section II-B),
it has not been broadly adopted in crowdsensing systems.
In this paper, we integrate differentially private mechanisms
into the crowdsensing system as well, which can provide
strong protection against various types of possible attacks (see
Section III-C).
C. Proposed work
This paper presents Crowd-ML, a privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning framework for crowdsensing system that con-
sists of a server and smart devices (see Fig. 1). Crowd-ML
is a distributed learning framework that integrates sensing,
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Fig. 1: Crowd-ML consists of a server and a number of smart
devices. The system integrates sensing, learning, and privacy
mechanisms together, to learn a classifier or predictor from
device-generated data in an online and distributed way, with
formal privacy guarantees.
learning, and privacy mechanisms together, and can build
classifiers or predictors of interest from crowdsensing data
using computing capability of devices with formal privacy
guarantees.
Algorithmically, Crowd-ML learns a classifier or predictor
by a distributed incremental optimization. Optimal parameters
of a classifier or predictor are found by minimizing the risk
function associated with a given task [5] (see Section III-A
for details). Specifically, the framework finds optimal param-
eters by incrementally minimizing the risk function using a
variant of stochastic (sub)gradient descent (SGD) [6]. Unlike
batch learning, SGD requires only the gradient information
to be communicated between devices and a server, which
has two important consequences: 1) computation load can be
distributed among the devices, enhancing scalability of the sys-
tem; 2) private data of the devices need not be communicated
directly, enhancing privacy. By exploiting these two properties,
Crowd-ML efficiently learns a classifier or predictor from a
crowd of devices, with a guarantee of -differential privacy.
Differential privacy mechanism is applied locally on each
device, using Laplace noise for the gradients and exponential
mechanisms for other information (see Section III-C).
We show advantages of Crowd-ML by analyzing its scala-
bility and privacy-performance trade-offs (Section IV), and by
testing the framework with demonstrative tasks implemented
on Android smartphones and in simulated environments under
various conditions (see Section V).
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present Crowd-ML, a general framework for machine
learning with smart devices from crowdsensing data, with
many potential applications.
• We show differential privacy guarantees of Crowd-ML
that provide a strong privacy mechanism against various
types of attacks in crowdsensing. To the best of our
knowledge, Crowd-ML is the first general framework
that integrates sensing, learning, and differentially private
mechanisms for crowdsensing.
• We analyze the framework to show that the cost of
privacy preservation can be minimized and that the com-
putational and communication overheads on devices are
only moderate, allowing a large-scale deployment of the
framework.
• We implement a prototype and evaluate the framework
with a demonstrative task in a real environment as well
as large-scale experiments in a simulated environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first review related work in Section II. Section III describes
the Crowd-ML framework. Section IV analyzes Crowd-ML
in terms of privacy-performance trade-off, computation, and
communication loads. Section V presents an implementation
of Crowd-ML and experimental evaluations. We discuss re-
maining issues and conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Crowd-ML integrates distributed learning algorithms and
differential privacy mechanisms into a crowdsensing system.
In this section, we review related work in crowdsensing and
learning systems, and privacy-preserving mechanisms.
A. Crowdsensing and learning
There is a vast amount of work in crowdsensing, and we
focus on the system aspect of previous work with represen-
tative papers (we refer the reader to survey papers [7] and
[1]). Crowdsensing systems aim to achieve mass collection and
mining of environmental and human-centric data such as social
interactions, political issues of interest, exercise patterns, and
people’s impact on the environment [8]. Examples of such
systems include Micro-Blog [9], PoolView [10], BikeNet [11],
and PEIR [12]. Data collected by crowdsensing can also be
used to mine high-level patterns or to predict variables of in-
terest using machine learning. Applications of learning applied
to crowdsensing include learning of bus waiting times [13] and
recognizing user activities (see [14] for a review). Jigsaw [15]
and Lifestreams [16] also use pattern recognition in sensed
data from mobile devices. From the system perspective, these
work use devices to passively sense and send data to a central
server on which analyses take place, which we will refer to as
the centralized approach. In contrast, sensing and learning can
be performed purely inside each device without a server, which
we call the decentralized approach. For example, SoundSense
[17] learns a classifier on a smartphone to recognized various
audio events without communicating with the back-end. Mixed
centralized and decentralized approaches are also used in [18],
[19], where a portion of computation is performed off-line on
a server. CQue [18] provides a query interface for privacy-
aware probabilistic learning of users’ contexts, and ACE [19]
uses static association rules to learn users’ contexts. System-
wise, our work differs from those centralized or decentralized
approaches in that we use a distributed approach to perform
learning by devices and server together, which improves
privacy and scalability of the system. We are not aware of
any other crowdsensing system that takes a similar approach.
Also, the cited papers are oriented towards novel applications,
but our work focuses on a general framework for learning a
wide range of algorithms and applications.
Crowd-ML also builds on recent advances in incremental
distributed learning [20], [21], which show that a near-optimal
convergence rate is achievable despite communication delays.
A privacy-preserving stochastic gradient descent method is
presented briefly in [22]. Unlike the latter, we presents a
complete framework for privacy-preserving multi-device learn-
ing, with performance analysis and demonstrations in real
environments.
B. Privacy-preserving mechanisms
Privacy is an important issue in data collection and analy-
sis. In particular, preserving privacy of users’ locations has
been studied by many researchers (see [23] for a survey).
To preserve privacy of general data types formally, several
mechanisms such as k-anonymity [24] and secure multiparty
computation [25] have been proposed, for data publishing
[26] and also for participatory sensing [1]. Recently, differ-
ential privacy [2]–[4] has addressed several weaknesses of
k-anonymity [27], and gained popularity as a quantifiable
measure of privacy risk. Differential privacy has been used for
privacy-preserving data analysis platform [28], for sanitization
of learned models parameters from data [29], and for privacy-
preserving data mining from distributed time-series data [17].
So far, formal and general privacy mechanisms have not been
adopted broadly in crowdsensing. Among the crowdsensing
systems cited in the previous section ( [9]–[13], [15]–[19],
[30], [31]), only [10], [12], [18] provide privacy mechanisms,
of which only [10] address the privacy more formally. To our
best knowledge, Crowd-ML is the first framework to provide
formal privacy guarantees in general crowd-based learning
with smart devices.
III. CROWD-ML
In this section, we describe our Crowd-ML in detail: system,
algorithms, and privacy mechanisms.
A. System and workflow
The Crowd-ML system consists of a server and multiple
smart devices that are capable of sensory data collection,
numerical computation, and communication over a public
network with the server (see Fig. 1). The goal of Crowd-
ML is to learn a classifier or predictor of interest from
crowdsensing data collectively by multiple devices. A wide-
range of classifiers or predictors can be learned by minimizing
an empirical risk associated with a given task, a common
method in statistical learning [5]. Formally, let x ∈ RD be a
feature vector from preprocessing sensory input such as audio,
video, accelerometer, etc, and y be a target variable we aim
to predict from x, such as user activity. For regression, y can
be a real number and for classification, y is a discrete label
y ∈ {1, ..., C} with C classes. We define data as N pairs
of (feature vector, target variable) generated i.i.d. from an
unknown distribution by all participating devices up to present:
D = {(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )}. (1)
Suppose we use a classifier/predictor h(x;w) with a tunable
parameter vector w, and a loss function l(y, h(x;w)) to mea-
sure the performance of the classifier/predictor with respect
to the true target y. A wide range of learning algorithms can
be represented by h and l, e.g., regression, logistic regression,
and Support Vector Machine (see [32] for more examples). If
there are M smart devices, we find the optimal parameters
w of the classifier/predictor by minimizing the empirical risk
over all M devices:
R(w) =
M∑
m=1
1
|Dm|
∑
(x,y)∈Dm
l(h(x;w), y) +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (2)
where Dm is a set of samples generated from device m only,
and λ2 ‖w‖2 is a regularization term. This risk function (2) can
be minimized by many optimization methods. In this work
we use stochastic (sub)gradient descent (SGD) [33] which is
one of the simplest optimization methods and is also suitable
for large-scale learning [32], [34]. SGD minimizes the risk by
updating w sequentially
w(t+ 1)← ΠW [w(t)− η(t)g(t)] , (3)
where η(t) is the learning rate, and g(t) is the gradient of the
loss function
g = ∇wl(h(x;w), y), (4)
evaluated with the sample (x, y) and the current parameter
w(t). We assume the parameter domain W is a d-dimensional
ball of some large radius R, and the projection is ΠW =
min(1, R/‖w‖)w. By default, we use the learning rate
η(t) =
c√
t
, (5)
where c is a constant hyperparameter. When computing gra-
dients, we use a ‘minibatch’ of b samples to compute the
averaged gradient
g˜ =
1
b
∑
i
∇wl(h(xi;w), yi), (6)
which plays an important role in the performance-privacy
trade-off and the scalability (Section IV). In Crowd-ML, risk
minimization by SGD is performed by distributing the main
workload (=computation of averaged gradients) to M devices.
Note that each device generates data and compute gradients
using its own data. The workflow is described in Fig. 2.
B. Algorithms
Crowd-ML algorithms are presented in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Device Routine 1 collects samples. When the number of
samples reaches the minibatch size b, the routine tries to
checks out the current model parameters w from the server
and calls Device Routine 2. Device Routine 2 computes the
averaged gradient from the stored samples and w received
from the server, sanitizes information by Device Routine 3,
and sends the sanitized information to the server. Device
Routine 3 uses Laplace noise and exponential mechanisms
(in the next section) to sanitize the averaged gradient gˆ, the
Fig. 2: Crowd-ML workflow. 1. A device preprocesses sensory
data and generates a sample(s). 2. When the number of
samples {(x, y)} exceeds a certain number, the device requests
current model parameters w from the server. 3. The server
authenticate the device and sends w. 4. Using w and {(x, y)},
the device computes the gradient g and send it to the server
using privacy mechanisms. 5. The server receives the gradient
g and updates w. While one device is performing routines 1-
5, another device(s) are allowed to perform the same routines
asynchronously. Devices can join or leave the task at any time.
number of misclassified samples nˆe and the label counts
nˆky . Device Routines 1-3 are performed independently and
asynchronously by multiple devices.
Server Routine 1 sends out current parameters w when
requested and Server Routine 2 receives checkins (gˆ, ns,
nˆe,nˆky) from devices when requested. The whole procedure
ends when the total number of iteration exceeds a maximum
value Tmax, or the overall error is below a threshold ρ.
Remark 1: In Device Routine 1, if check-out fails, the
device keeps collecting samples and retries check-out later.
A prolonged period of network outage for a device can make
the parameter outdated for the device, but it does not affect
the overall learning critically. Similarly, failure to check-in
information with server in Device Routine 2 is non-critical.
Remark 2: In Device Routine 2, we can randomly set aside
a small portion of samples as test data. In this case, the
misclassification error is computed only from these held-out
samples, and their gradients will not be used in the average gˆ.
Remark 3: In Server Routine 2, more recent update methods
[35], [36] can be used in place of the simple update rule
(3) without affecting differential privacy nor changing device
routines. Similarly, adaptive learning rates [37], [38] can be
used in place of (5), which can provide a robustness to large
gradients from outlying or malignant devices.
C. Privacy mechanism
In crowdsensing systems, private data of users can be leaked
by many ways. System administrators/analysts can violate the
privacy intentionally, or they may leak private information
unintentionally when publishing data analytics. There are also
more hostile types of attacks: by malignant devices posing
Algorithm 1 Device side
Input: privacy levels g, e, yk , minibatch size b, max buffer
size B, classifier model (C, h, l, λ from Eq. (2))
Init: set ns = 0, ne = 0, nky = 0, k = 1, ..., C
Communication to server: gˆ, ns, nˆe, nˆky
Communication from server: w
Device Routine 1
if ns ≥ B then
stop collection to prevent resource outage
else
receive a sample (x, y) (in a regular interval or triggered
by events), and add to the secure local buffer
ns = ns + 1
end if
if ns ≥ b then
checkout w from the server via https
call Device Routine 2.
end if
Device Routine 2
Using w from the server and {(x, y)} from the local buffer,
for i = 1, ..., ns do
make a prediction ypred = h(xi;w)
n
(yi)
y = n
(yi)
y + 1
ne = ne + I[y
pred
i 6= yi]
Incur a loss l(ypred, yi)
Compute a subgradient gi = ∇wl(h(xi;w))
end for
Compute the average g˜ = 1ns
∑
i gi + λw
Sanitize data with Device Routine 3
Checkin gˆ, ns, nˆe nˆky , k = 1, ..., C with server via https
Reset ns = 0, ne = 0, nky = 0, k = 1, ..., C
Device Routine 3
Sample gˆ = g˜ + z from Eq. (10)
Sample nˆe = ne + z from Eq. (11)
Sample nˆky = n
k
y + z, k = 1, ..., C from Eq. (12)
as legitimate devices, by hackers poaching data stored on the
server or eavesdropping on communication between devices
and servers. Instead of preserving privacy separately for each
attack type, we can preserve privacy from all these attacks
by a local privacy-preserving mechanism that is implemented
on each device and sanitizes any information before it leaves
the device. A local mechanism assumes that an adversary
can potentially access all communication between devices and
the server, which subsumes the other attack attacks. This is
because the other forms of data that are 1) visible to malignant
device, 2) stored in the server, or 3) released in public, are all
derived from what is communicated between devices and the
server. We adopt a local -differential privacy as a quantifiable
measure of privacy in Crowd-ML. Formally, a (randomized)
algorithm which takes data D as input and outputs f , is called
Algorithm 2 Sever side
Input: number of devices M , learning rate schedule η(t), t =
1, 2, ..., Tmax, desired error ρ, classifier model (C, h, l, λ from
Eq. (2))
Init: t = 0, randomized w, Nms = 0, N
m
e = 0, N
k,m
y , m =
1, ...,M, k = 1, ..., C
Stopping criteria: t ≥ Tmax or
∑M
m N
m
e∑M
m N
m
s
≤ ρ
Server Routine 1
while Stopping criteria not met do
Listen to and accept checkout requests
Authenticate device
Send current parameters w to device
end while
Server Routine 2
while Stopping criteria not met do
Listen to and accept checkin requests
Authenticate device (suppose it is device m)
Receive gˆ, ns, nˆe, nˆky , k = 1, ..., C.
Nms = N
m
s + ns
Nme = N
m
e + nˆe
Nk,my = N
k,m
y + nˆ
k
y
w = w − η(t)gˆ
t = t+ 1
end while
-differentially private if
P (f(D) ∈ S)
P (f(D′) ∈ S) ≤ e
 (7)
for all measurable S ⊂ T of the output range, and for all
data sets D and D′ differing in a single item. That is, even
if an adversary has the whole data D except a single item,
it cannot infer much more about that item from the output
of the algorithm f . A smaller  makes such an inference
more difficult, and therefore makes the algorithm more private-
preserving. When the algorithm outputs a real-valued vector
f ∈ RD, its global sensitivity can be defined by
S(f) = max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1. (8)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 norm. A basic result from the definition
of differential privacy is that a vector-valued function f with
sensitivity S(f) can be made -differentially private [3] by
adding an independent Laplace noise vector z1
P (z) ∝ e− S(f)‖z‖1 . (9)
In Crowd-ML, we consider -differential privacy of any single
(feature,label)-sample, revealed by communications from all
devices to the server, which are the gradients g˜, the numbers
of samples ns, the number of misclassified samples ne, and
the labels counts nky
2. The amount of noise required depends
1As a variant, (, δ)-differential privacy can be achieved by adding Gaussian
noise.
2The communication from the server to devices {w(t)} can be recon-
structed by (3) from {g(t)}, and therefore is redundant to consider.
TABLE I: Multiclass logistic regression
Prediction argmaxk w′kx
Risk R(w) = 1
N
∑
i[−w′yixi + log
∑
l e
w′lxi ] +
λ
2
∑
k ‖wk‖2
Gradient ∇wkR = 1N
∑
i xi[−I[yi = k] + P (y = k|xi)] + λwk
on the choice of loss functions. We compute this value for
multiclass logistic regression (Table I), but it can be computed
similarly for other loss functions as well. By adding element-
wise independent Laplace noise z to averaged gradients g˜
gˆ =
1
b
∑
i
gi + z, P (z) ∝ e−
gb
4 |z|, (10)
we have the following privacy guarantee:
Theorem 1 (Averaged gradient perturbation). The transmis-
sion of g˜ by Eq. (10) is g-differentially private.
See Appendix A for proof.
To sanitize ne and nky , we add ‘discrete’ Laplace noise [39]
as follows:
nˆe = ne + z, P (z) ∝ e−
e
2 |z|, (11)
nˆky = n
k
y + z, P (z) ∝ e−

yk
2 |z|, (12)
where z = 0,±1,±2, .... These mechanisms has the following
privacy guarantees:
Theorem 2 (Error and label counts). The transmission of ne
and nky by Eqs. (11) and (12) is e- and yk - differentially
private, respectively.
See Appendix B for proof.
Practically, a system administrator chooses  depending on
the desired level of privacy for the data collected. A small
(→ 0) may be used for data that users deem highly private
such as current location, and a large (→∞) may be used for
less private data such as ambient temperature.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the privacy-performance trade-
off and the scalability of Crowd-ML. As discussed in Related
Work, most existing crowdsensing systems use purely cen-
tralized or purely decentralized approaches, while Crowd-ML
uses a distributed approach. By design, Crowd-ML achieves
differential privacy with little loss of performance (O(1/b)),
only moderate computation load due to its simple optimization
method, and reduced communication load and delay (O(1/b)),
where b is the minibatch size.
A. Privacy vs Performance
Privacy costs performance: the more private we make the
system, the less accurate the outcome of analysis/learning
is. From Theorem 1, Crowd-ML is -differentially private
by perturbing averaged gradients. The centralized approach
can also be made -differentially private by feature and
label perturbation (Appendix C). Below we compare the
impact of privacy on performance between the centralized
and Crowd-ML. The performance of an SGD-based learning
can be represented by its rate of convergence to the optimal
value/parameters E[l(w(t))−l(w∗)] at iteration t, which in turn
depends on the properties of the loss l(·) (such as Lipschitz-
continuity and strong-convexity) and the step size η(t), with
the best known rate being O(1/t) [40]. When other conditions
are the same, the convergence rate is roughly proportional
E[l(w(t)) − l(w∗)] ∝ G2 to the amount of noise in the
estimated gradient G2 = supt E[‖gˆ(t)‖2] [41]. For Crowd-
ML, we have from (10)
E[‖gˆ‖2] = E[‖g˜‖2] + E[‖z‖2] = 1
b
E[‖g‖2] + 32D
(bg)2
, (13)
where the first term is the amount of noise due to sampling,
and the latter is due to Laplace noise mechanism with D-
dimensional features. By choosing a large enough batch size
b, the impact of sampling noise and Laplace noise can be made
arbitrarily small3. In contrast, the centralized approach has
to add Laplace noise of constant variance 82 to each feature
and perturb labels with a constant probability (Appendix C).
Regardless of which optimization method is used (SGD or
not), the centralized approach has no means of mitigating the
negative impact of constant noise on the accuracy of learned
model, which will be especially problematic with a small .
In the decentralized approach, a device need not interact
with a server, and is almost free of privacy concerns. However,
the increased privacy comes at the cost of performance. In
Crowd-ML and the centralized approach, samples pooled from
all devices are used in the learning process, whereas in the
decentralized approach, each device can use only a fraction
(∼ 1/M ) of samples. This undermines the accuracy of a model
learned by the decentralized approach. For example, it is
known from the VC-theory for binary classification problems
that the upper-bound of the estimation error with a 1/M -times
smaller sample size is
√
M/ logM -times larger [43].
B. Scalability
Scalability is determined by computation and communi-
cation loads and latencies on both device and server sides.
We compare these factors between centralized, crowd, and
decentralized learning approaches.
1) Computation load: For all three approaches, we assume
the same preprocessing is performed on each device to com-
pute features from raw sensory input or metadata. On the de-
vice side, the centralized learning approach requires generation
of Laplace noise per sample on the device. The crowd and
the decentralized approaches perform partial and full learning
on the device, respectively, and requires more processing.
Specifically, Crowd-ML requires computation of a gradient per
sample, a vector summation (for averaging) per sample, and
generation of Laplace random noise per minibatch. A low-
end smart device capable of floating-point computation can
3although a larger batch size means fewer updates given the same number
of samples N , and too large a batch size can negatively affect the convergence
rate (see [42] for discussion).
perform these operations. The decentralized learning approach
can use any learning algorithms, including SGD similar to
Crowd-ML. However, if the decentralized approach is to make
up for the smaller sample size (1/M ) compared to Crowd-
ML, it may require more complex optimization methods which
results in higher computation load. For all three approaches,
the number of devices M do not affect per-device computation
load. Computational load on the server is also different for
these approaches. The centralized approach puts the highest
load on the server, as all computations take place on the
server. In contrast, Crowd-ML puts minimal load on the server
which is the SGD update (3), since the main computation is
performed distributed by the devices.
2) Communication load: To process incoming streams of
data from the device in time, the network and the server should
have enough throughput. The centralized learning approach
requires N number of samples to be sent over the network to
the server. For Crowd-ML with a minibatch size of b, devices
send N/b gradients altogether, and receives the same number
of current parameters, both of the same dimension as a feature
vector. Therefore, the data transmission is reduced by a factor
of b/2 compared to the centralized approach.
3) Communication latency: When using a public (and
mobile) network, latency is non-negligible. In the centralized
approach, latency may not be an issue, since the server need
not required to send any real-time feedback to the devices. In
Crowd-ML, latency is an issue that can affect its performance.
There are three possible delays that add up to the overall
latency of communication:
• Request delay(τreq): time since the check-out request
from a device until the receipt of the request at the server
• Check-out delay (τco): time since the receipt of a request
at the server and the receipt of the parameter at the device
• Check-in delay (τci): time since the receipt of the param-
eters at the device until the receipt of the check-ins at the
server
Due to delays, if a device checks out the parameter w at time
t0 and checks in the gradient gˆ and the server receives gˆ
at time t0 + τco + τci, the server may have already updated
the parameters w multiple times using the gradients from
other devices received during this time period. This number
of updates is roughly (τco + τci) ×MFs/b, where M is the
number of devices, Fs is the data sampling rate per device, and
1/b is the reduction factor due to minibatch. Again, choosing
a large batch size b relative to MFs can reduce the latency.
While exact analysis of impact of latency is difficult, there are
several related results known in the literature without consid-
ering privacy. Nedic´ et al. proved that delayed asynchronous
incremental update converges with probability 1 to an optimal
value, assuming a finite maximum latency. Recent work in
distributed incremental update [20], [21] also shows that a
near-optimal convergence rate is achievable despite delays. In
particular, Dekel et al. [21] shows that delayed incremental
updates are scalable with M by adapting the minibatch size.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe a prototype of Crowd-ML
implemented on off-the-shelf android phones and activity
recognition experiments on android smartphones. We also per-
form digit and object recognition experiments under varying
conditions in simulated environments and demonstrate the
advantages of Crowd-ML analyzed in Section IV.
A. Implementation
We implement a Crowd-ML prototype with three compo-
nents: a Web portal, commercial off-the-shelf smart devices,
and a central server. On the device side, we implement
Algorithm 1 on commercial off-the-shelf smartphones as an
app using Android OS 4.3+. Our prototype uses smartphones,
but will be easily ported to other smart device platforms.
On the server side, we implement Algorithm 2 on a Lenovo
ThinkCentre M82 machine with a quad-core 3.2 GHz Intel
Core i5-3470 CPU and 4 GB RAM running Ubuntu Linux
14.04. The server runs the Apache Web server (version 2.4)
and a MySQL database (version 5.5).
Also on the server side, our Crowd-ML prototype provides
a Web portal over HTTPS where users can browse ongoing
crowd-learning tasks and join them by downloading the app
to their smart devices. To enhance transparency, details of
tasks (objective, sensory data collected, labels collected, and
learning algorithms used) and our privacy mechanisms is ex-
plained. It also displays timely statistics about crowd-learning
applications such as error rates and activity label distributions,
which are differentially private. We implement the portal in
Python using the Django4 Web application framework and
Matplotlib5 for statistical visualization.
B. Activity Recognition in Real Environments
In this experiment, we perform activity recognition on smart
devices. The purpose of this demonstration is to show Crowd-
ML working in a real environment, so we choose a simple task
of recognizing three types of user activities (“Still”, “On Foot”,
and “In Vehicle”). We install a prototype Crowd-ML applica-
tion on 7 smartphones (Galaxy Nexus, Nexus S, and Galaxy
S3) running Android 4.3 or 4.4. The seven smartphones are
carried by college students and faculty over a period of a
few days. The devices’ triaxial accelerometers are sampled
at 20 Hz. In this demonstration, we avoid manual annotation
of activity labels to facilitate data acquisition, and instead
use Google’s activity recognition service to obtain ground
truth labels. Acceleration magnitudes |a| =
√
a2x + a
2
y + a
2
z
are computed continuously over 3.2 s sliding windows. Fea-
ture extraction is performed by computing the 64-bin FFT
of the acceleration magnitudes. We set the sampling rate
Fs = 1/30 Hz, that is, a feature vector x and its label y
is generated every 30 s. However, to avoid getting highly
correlated samples and to increase diversity of features, we
collect a sample only when its label has changed from its
4http://www.djangoproject.com
5http://matplotlib.org
previous value. For example, samples acquired during sleeping
are discard automatically as they all have “Still” labels. This
lowers the actual sampling rate to about Fs = 1/352 Hz (or
every six minute or so). With this low rate, no battery problem
was observed.
We use 3-class logistic regression (Table I) with λ = 0, b =
1, −1 = 0 and a range of η values. Repeated experiments
with different parameters are time-consuming, and we leave
the full investigation to the second experiment in a simulated
environment. In Fig. 3, we shows the collective error curves for
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Fig. 3: Time-averaged error across all devices for activity
recognition task.
the first 300 samples from the 7 devices. The error is a time-
averaged misclassification error as the learning progresses:
Err(t) = 1t
∑t
i=1 I[yi 6= ypredi (wi)]. The error curves for
different learning rates (5) are very similar, and virtually
converge after only 50 samples (=7 samples per device). This
experiment is a proof-of-concept that Crowd-ML can learn a
common classifier fast, from only a small number of samples
per user.
C. Digit/Object Recognition in Simulated Environments
To evaluate Crowd-ML under various conditions, we per-
form a series of experiments on handwritten digit recognition
and visual object recognition. Since the two results are quite
similar, we only describe the digit recognition results (object
recognition result is in Appendix D). The MNIST dataset6
consists of 60000 training and 10000 test images of handwrit-
ten digits (0 to 9), which is a standard benchmark dataset for
learning algorithms. The task is to classify a test image as
one of the 10 digit classes. The images from MNIST data are
preprocessed with PCA to have a reduced dimension of 50,
and L1 normalized. In this experiment, we compare the perfor-
mance of centralized, Crowd-ML, and decentralized learning
approaches using the same data and classifier (multiclass
logistic regression), under different conditions such as privacy
level , minibatch size b, and delays. To test the algorithms
with a full control of parameters, we run the algorithms in
a simulated environment instead of on a real network. We
can therefore choose the number of devices and maximum
delays arbitrarily. For simplicity, we set τ = τreq = τco = τci
(Section IV-B3). The τ is the maximum delay, and the actually
delays are sampled randomly and uniformly from [0, τ ] for
each communication instance.7
6http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
7We can test with any distribution other than uniform distribution as well.
All results in this section are averaged test errors from 10
trials. For each trial, assignment of samples, order of devices,
perturbation noise, and amounts of delay are randomized.
Test errors are computed as functions of the iteration (=the
number of samples used), up to five passes through the data.
Hyperparameters λ (Table I) and c (5) are selected from the
averaged test error from 10 trials. We set the number of devices
M = 1000. Consequently, each device has 60 training and 10
test samples on average.
Fig. 4 compares the performance of the centralized, crowd,
and decentralized learning approaches, without privacy or
delay (−1 = 0, b = 1, τ = 0). The error of centralized
batch training is the smallest (0.1), in a tie with Crowd-ML.
The error curve of Crowd-ML converges to the same low value
as centralized approach. It shows that incremental update by
SGD in Crowd-ML is as accurate as batch learning, when
privacy and delay are not considered. In contrast, the error
curve of decentralized approach converges at a slower rate
and also converges to a high error (∼ 0.5), despite using the
same overall number of samples as other algorithms, due to
the lack of data sharing.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
x 104
0
0.5
1
Iterations
Test error
 
 
Decentral (SGD)
Crowd−ML (SGD)
Central (batch)
Fig. 4: Comparison of test error for centralized, crowd, and
decentralized learning approaches, without delay or privacy
consideration. The curves show how error decreases as the
number of iteration (=number of samples used) increases over
time. The batch algorithm is not incremental and therefore is
a constant.
We perform tests with varying levels of privacy . The
privacy impacts the centralized approach via (15) and (16)8
and also Crowd-ML via (10). With low privacy (−1 → 0),
the performance of both centralized and crowd approaches
are almost the same as Fig. 4, and we omit the result. With
high privacy ( → 0), the performance of both approaches
degrades to a unusable level. Here we show their performances
at −1 = 0.1 in Fig. 5, where the performance is in a transition
state between high and low privacy regions. Firstly, the central-
ized and crowd approaches both perform worse than they did
in Fig. 4, which is the price of privacy preservation. Among
these results, Crowd-ML with a minibatch size b = 20 has the
smallest asymptotic error, much below the centralized (batch).
Crowd-ML with b = 1 and 10 still achieves similar or better
asymptotic error compared to Central (batch). As predicted
from Section IV, increasing the minibatch size improves the
performance of Crowd-ML. When SGD is used for centralized
approach (Central SGD) with perturbed features and labels, its
8The features and labels for test data are not perturbed.
performance is very poor (∼ 0.9) regardless of the minibatch
size, due to the larger noise required to provide the same level
 of privacy as Crowd-ML.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of test error for centralized and crowd
learning approaches with privacy (−1 = 0.1), varying mini-
batch sizes (b), and no delay.
Lastly, we look at the impact of delays on Crowd-ML with
privacy −1 = 0.1. We test with different delays in the unit
of ∆ = τ/(MFs), that is, the number of samples generated
by all device during the delay of size τ . In Fig. 6, we show
the results with two minibatch sizes (b = 1, 20) and varying
delays (1∆, 10∆, 100∆, 1000∆). The delay of 1000∆ means
that a maximum of 3×1000 samples are generated among the
devices, between the time a single device requests a check-out
from the server and the time the server received the check-in
from that device, which is quite large. Fig. 6 shows that the
increase in the delay somewhat slows down the convergence
with a minibatch size of 1, and the converged value of error
is similar to or worse than Central (batch). However, it also
shows that with a minibatch size of 20, delay has little effect
on the convergence, and the error is much lower than Central
(batch). Note that with the minibatch size of 20, there is a
small plateau in the beginning of error curves, reflecting the
fact that the devices are initially waiting for their minibatches
to be filled before computing begins. After this initial waiting
time, the error starts to decrease at a fast rate.
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Fig. 6: Impact of delays on Crowd-ML with privacy (−1 =
0.1), varying minibatch sizes, and varying delays.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Crowd-ML, a machine learn-
ing framework for a crowd of smart devices. Compared to
previous crowdsensing systems, Crowd-ML is a framework
that integrates sensing, learning, and privacy mechanisms
together, and can build classifiers or predictors of interest
from crowdsensing data using computing capability of smart
devices. Algorithmically, Crowd-ML utilizes recent advances
in distributed and incremental learning, and implements strong
differentially private mechanisms. We analyzed Crowd-ML
and showed that Crowd-ML can outperform centralized ap-
proaches while providing better privacy and scalability, and
can also take advantages of larger shared data which decen-
tralized approaches cannot. We implemented a prototype of
Crowd-ML and evaluated the framework with a simple activity
recognition task in a real environment as well as larger-scale
experiments in simulated environments which demonstrate
the advantages of the design of Crowd-ML. Crowd-ML is a
general framework for a range of different learning algorithms
with crowdsensing data, and is open to further refinements for
specific applications.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In our algorithms, a device receives w from the server and
sends averaged gradients gˆ along with other information. We
assume ‖x‖1 ≤ 1 which can be easily achieved by normalizing
the data. The sensitivity of an averaged gradient for logistic
regression is 4/b as shown below. There are C parameter
vectors w1, ..., wC for multiclass logistic regression. Let the
matrix of gradient vectors corresponding to C parameter
vectors be
g = [g1 g2 · · · gC ] = x[P1 · · · Py−1 · · · PC ] + λ[w1 · · · wC ]
= xM + λ[w1 · · · wC ],
where Pj = P (y = j|x;w) is the posterior probability, and M
is a row vector of Pj’s. Without loss of generality, consider
two minibatches D and D′ that differ in only the first sample
x1. The difference of averaged gradients g˜(D) and g˜′(D′) is
‖g˜ − g˜′‖1 ≤ 1
b
(‖x1M1‖1 + ‖x′1M ′1‖1) ≤
4
b
,
To see ‖M1‖1 ≤ 2, note that the absolute sum of the entries of
M1 is 2(1−Py1) ≤ 2. The sensitivity of multiple minibatches
gˆ(1), ..., gˆ(T ) is the same as the sensitivity of a single gˆ(t),
and the -differential privacy follows from Proposition 1 of
[3].
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In addition to the averaged gradients, a device sends to the
server the numbers of samples ns, the number of misclassified
samples ne, and the labels counts nky . Perturbation by adding
discrete Laplace noise is equivalent to random sampling by
exponential mechanism [44] with P (nˆe|ne) ∝ e− e2 |nˆe−ne|,
nˆe ∈ Z. If two datasets D and D′ are different in only one
item, then the score function d = −|nˆe−ne| changes at most
by 1. That is, maxD,D′ |d(nˆe, ne(D)) − d(nˆe, ne(D′))| = 1.
As with multiple gradients, the sensitivity of multiples sets
of (nˆe, nˆky) is the same as the sensitivity of a single set, and
e-differential privacy follows from Theorem 6 of [44]. Proof
of yk -differential privacy of nky is similar.
Remark 1: Unlike the gradient gˆ, the information (ns, nˆe,
nˆky) is not required for learning itself, but for monitoring the
progress of each device on the server side. Therefore, e and
yk can be set to be very small without affecting the learning
performance, so that  = g + e + Cyk ≈ g .
Remark 2: nˆe and nˆky can be negative with a small proba-
bility, but have a limited effect on the estimates of the error
rate and the prior at the server. After receiving T minibatches,
the error rate and the prior estimates are
Errest =
∑T
i nˆe(i)∑T
i ns(i)
and P est(y = k) =
∑T
i nˆ
k
y(i)∑T
i ns(i)
. (14)
Since nˆe(i)−ne(i) is independent for i = 1, 2, ... and has zero-
mean and constant variance 2e
−e/2
(1−e−e/2)2 [39], the estimate of
error rate converge almost surely to the true error rate with
vanishing variances as T increases. The same can be said of
the estimate of prior P (y).
C. Differential Privacy in Centralized Approach
For completeness of the paper, we also describe the -
differential privacy mechanisms for the centralized approach.
In the centralized approach, data are directly sent to the server.
Without a privacy mechanism, an adversary can potentially
observe all data. To prevent this, -differential privacy can be
enforced by perturbing the features
f(x) = x+ z, , P (z) ∝ e− x2 |z|, (15)
and also perturbing the labels. To perturb labels, we use
exponential mechanism to sample a noisy label yˆ given a true
label y from
P (yˆ|y) ∝ e y2 d(y,yˆ), y, yˆ ∈ {1, ..., C} (16)
where we use the score function d(y, yˆ) = I[y = yˆ].
Theorem 3 (Feature and label perturbation). The transmission
of x and y by feature perturbation (15) and exponential
mechanism (16) is x- and y-differentially private.
Proof: Assume ‖x‖1 ≤ 1. Feature transmission is an
identity operation and therefore has sensitivity 2. For label
transmission, the score function d(yˆ, y) = I[yˆ = y] changes
at most by 1 by changing y. From Proposition 1 of [3]
and Theorem 6 of [44], respectively, we achieve x- and y-
differential privacy of data.
Note that the sensitivity is independent of the number of
features and labels sent, and we have to add the same level
of independent noise to the features and apply the same
amount of label perturbation. An overall -differential privacy
is achieved by  = x+ y . The required privacy levels x and
y can be chosen differently, and we use x = y = /2 in the
experiments.
D. Experiments with Visual Object Recognition Task
We repeat the experiments in Section V-C for an object
recognition task using CIFAR-10 dataset, which consists of
images of 10 types of objects (airplane, automobile, bird,
cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, truck) collected by [45].
We use 50,000 training and 10,000 test images from CIFAR-
10. To compute features, we use a convolutional neural
network 9 trained using ImageNet ILSVRC2010 dataset10,
which consists of 1.2 million images of 1000 categories. We
apply CIFAR-10 images to the network, and use the 4096-
dimensional output from the last hidden layer of the network as
features. Those features are preprocessed with PCA to have a
reduced dimension of 100, and are L1 normalized. We use the
same setting in Section V-C to test Crowd-ML on this object
recognition task. The results are given in Figs. 7, 8, 9. The
figures are very similar to the handwritten digit recognition
task (Figs. 4, 5, 6), except that the error is larger (e.g., 0.3 in
Fig. 7) than the error for digit recognition (0.1 in Fig. 4). This
is because CIFAR dataset is more challenging than MNIST
due to variations in color, pose, view point, and background
of object images.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of test error for centralized, crowd, and
decentralized learning approaches, without delay or privacy
consideration.
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